Fernando Pessoa claimed to be inhabited by “thousands of philosophies,” all of which he intended to develop in his unfinished project of English-language Philosophical Essays. Pessoa himself never published the resulting fragments and nearly the entirety of them are presented in this edition for the very first time in history.

This volume exhibits Pessoa’s musings and wild insights on the history of philosophy, the failures of subjectivity, and the structure of the universe to reveal an unexpectedly scholarly, facetious, and vigorous theoretical mind. Written mainly under the pre-heteronyms of Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search, these texts constitute the foundation for the fabrication of Pessoa’s future heteronyms. They are the testimony of a writer who referred to himself as a “poet animated by philosophy.”

Through editor Nuno Ribeiro’s careful critical efforts, a new and fundamental facet of the work of one of modernity’s most seminal geniuses has now been brought to light in a remarkably reliable and clear fashion.
Selected Other Works by
Fernando Pessoa

Mensagem
Tales of a Reasoner
The Book of Disquietude
The Keeper of Sheep
The Education of the Stoic
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

A CRITICAL EDITION

Fernando Pessoa

EDITION, NOTES, & INTRODUCTION

Nuno Ribeiro

AFTERWORD

Paulo Borges
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INTRODUCTION
The Portuguese poet and thinker Fernando Pessoa was born in Lisbon on June 13, 1888, to Maria Magdalena Pinheiro Nogueira & Joaquim de Seabra Pessoa. Pessoa’s father died of tuberculosis on July 13, 1893, when Pessoa was five years old, and in December 1895, Pessoa’s mother married João Miguel Rosa. The trajectory of Pessoa’s life changed drastically in January 1896, when Rosa moved the new family to Durban, South Africa, where he began to serve as the Portuguese consul. As a result of his stepfather’s position, Pessoa grew up in South Africa and had an English education. This would deeply affect his mature literary production, much of which was written in English.

Pessoa first attended St. Joseph’s in Durban, a convent school run by Dominican Sisters, and was transferred to Durban High School in April 1899, where he studied for the next three years (see image next page).
**Durban High School Record.**

**Year**

[To be filled in at Editorial Offices.]

**DETAILS FOR THE SCHOOL ROLL.**

You are urgently requested to fill in this form and return it at your earliest convenience to—

**G. G. COLLINS, COMMERCE COURT, DURBAN.**

Please add the names and addresses of any of your contemporaries or other O.B.'s whom you know. The Editors desire to impress upon Old Boys that owing to the incomplete state of the School Registers, the most cordial coöperation of correspondents is necessary in order that the "Record" may be of real value. Old Boys who have not been communicated with previously are informed that the "D.H.S. Record" will be published about May, 1909, and will form a complete (most profusely illustrated) history of the School. There will be about 500 pp. of letterpress and the volume will be bound in full leather. Copies may be ordered, price £1 1s., each (payable on delivery) from the Publishers, Messrs. JOSE, STEELCROFT & SONS, West Street, Durban. A list of Subscribers will be published with the book.

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**NAME (in full):** Fernando Antonio Nugrahn Perrea.

**Year of Entry:** First time, April, 1899; second time, February, 1904.

**Year of Departure:** First time, June, 1901; second time, December, 1904.

**HOUSE:** When I was first at School three were no houses, the second term, I was in Ballant's House.

**ADDRESS:** P.O. Box 315, Durban.

---

**School Career:**

[Under this heading please state what form you were in, what exams you passed, School prizes secured, whether you were a Banner, Exhibitions, etc., also any "House" or School colours secured, your best athletic performances, etc. Give details where possible.]

I entered into Form II A, passed in June into II A, and a year after (June 1901) into the Third Form. After six months I was put into the IV, which I left on the first day of departure above-mentioned. From my return to the definite departure I was in the VI Form. I passed the Cape School Higher Examination, in the First Class, in June 1901, and in December 1899, the Cape Intermediate, in the Second Class. I secured three school prizes: 1. From Pages in Form II A (Dec 1899) and VI (June 1901) and a French Prize in the VI Form.

---

**Subsequent Career:**

[Under this heading please state your subsequent school (if any) and University; your professional or Commercial successes and your athletic performances, Also your present occupation, Municipal, Colonial or Imperial Honours, whether married (if so, to whom and date), whether in the Militia (if so, name of corps, rank and service). Any other details (e.g. list of publications) will be welcome.]

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[BNP/E3, 28a–20r]
In 1901, Pessoa passed the Cape School Higher Examination with distinction, and in August of the same year embarked for Portugal with his family, where they remained for a year. When Pessoa returned to South Africa in September 1902, he was enrolled in the Durban Commercial School, and then in 1903 he applied to the University of the Cape of Good Hope. Pessoa’s marks on the Matriculation Examination were unimpressive, but he was nevertheless awarded — of 899 candidates — a Queen Victoria Memorial Prize for the best essay in English. When he later took the Intermediate Examination at the University of the Cape of Good Hope, in 1904, he obtained the highest results of all the regional candidates from Natal, South Africa. Pessoa’s marks on the Intermediate Examination entitled him to a scholarship to study in England, but the scholarship had a condition: recipients had to have studied in South Africa for the three previous years. Since Pessoa’s return to Portugal in 1901–1902 had interrupted his residency, he was deemed ineligible. With England ruled out, Pessoa decided to definitively return to Portugal, where he enrolled in the Curso Superior de Letras (Superior
Course of Letters) at the University of Lisbon. Pessoa attended philosophy classes in 1906 & 1907, and it was during this early period in Lisbon that he elaborated his projects for philosophical works. In South Africa, he had primarily been concerned with literary and poetic projects, so the Lisbon years constitute a turning point: they are characterized by Pessoa’s emphasis on philosophical research and his interest in penning philosophical works. During these Lisbon years, he outlined many philosophical essays in English, while his interest in philosophy and philosophical projects later appears to diminish.

But throughout his life, Pessoa never abandoned the idea of writing in English. His first literary experiments were published in English, in the South African *Natal Mercury* — including a poem he signed as Charles Robert Anon. This reveals that Pessoa’s practice of writing under other names originates in his youth, as I will discuss in more detail below. After his return to Portugal, Pessoa continues to write in English — as mature texts like “Antinous” and 35 Sonnets both demonstrate. Above all, however, it is Pessoa’s philosophical essays & project drafts that reflect his lasting interest in writing in English. All of the pieces in this volume were originally composed in English, and this is one aspect of their significance. Given a global interest in the philosophical subtlety of Pessoa’s poetry, the publication of his English philosophical essays should provoke no less interest.
Prominent international philosophers like Alain Badiou and Simon Critchley have worked on Pessoa’s poetry, while Portuguese intellectuals have likewise treated Pessoa as a philosophical provocateur.¹ In the wake of classic works such as José Gil’s *Fernando Pessoa ou la métaphysique des sensations*, Eduardo Lourenço’s *Fernando Pessoa, Roi de notre Bavière*, and Paulo Borges’ *O Teatro da Vacuidade ou a impossibilidade de ser eu*, a new generation of Portuguese and international researchers are engaged in philosophical investigations of Pessoa’s work, too.² The present edition can serve as an illuminating guide for future work on Pessoa’s relationship to philosophy.


² For example, see the volume edited by Paulo Borges entitled *Olhares Europeus sobre Fernando Pessoa* (Lisbon: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 2010), which contains essays by Portuguese, Spanish, German, and Italian thinkers.
In 1905, the year Pessoa returned to Portugal, he began a long and intense period of literary creation that lasted until his death in 1935, though most of this work remained unknown during his life. In fact, Pessoa published only one book while he was alive, Mensagem (Message), which was released the year before his death. Aside from Mensagem, he also published poems and articles in a variety of literary journals and magazines, but those texts did not constitute a book. Rather, they were generally conceived as parts of other books — books that were to come — as he asserts in many of his letters.

In the Pessoa Archive, which is housed in the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), one finds outlines for a host of projects as well as fragments Pessoa wrote in Portuguese, English, and French on the most diverse topics. Besides his poetry and fiction, Pessoa delves into politics and economics, mysticism and astrology. These unpublished writings have provided the grist for a number of philological, literary, and philosophical studies since Pessoa’s death, and still give rise to disagreement over how best to publish them. Among Pessoa’s unpublished projects, one finds the Philosophical Essays — the material that comprises this volume.
Although some of the texts presented here have been published previously, most of them are being published here for the first time, while this edition is novel in other regards. To date, the only other edition to be exclusively concerned with Pessoa’s philosophical writings is António Pina Coelho’s *Textos Filosóficos de Fernando Pessoa*, which was first printed in 1968, and which suffers from a series of problems. To begin with, it contains only a limited selection of Pessoa’s philosophical texts — mainly those that are easiest to transcribe — while Coelho restricts himself to just four of the Pessoa Archive’s fourteen philosophical envelopes. Moreover, Coelho’s selection, transcription, & organization of Pessoa’s texts follow no critical criteria. Texts are ranged according to thematic concepts that correspond neither to any thematic principle established by Pessoa, nor to any project conceived by Pessoa for distributing these texts. In effect, Coelho presents the various *Textos Filosóficos* as if they were loose sheets, lacking any discernible connection among themselves. Perhaps due to this, his edition failed to evoke any serious interest in Pessoa’s philosophical writings.\(^5\)

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3. It is impossible to state exactly the precise number of unpublished texts considering the amount of articles and books concerning new aspects of the Pessoa Archive that have been and are currently being published. As a reference, we follow the main editions of Pessoa’s work.

Two other volumes related to this material include Pedro Teixeira da Mota’s *Fernando Pessoa. Moral, Regras de Vida, Condições de Iniciação*, and Teresa Rita Lopes’ *Pessoa Inédito*. Mota’s book contains a selection of philosophical writings that concern moral problems — notably, some projects for Pessoa’s “Essay on Free-Will.” But his edition is only partially devoted to philosophical texts; it also contains mystical & ritual texts by Pessoa, as well as literary texts that are not directly linked to his philosophical efforts. Moreover, Mota’s selection — like Coelho’s — follows no principle or project established by Pessoa. In Lopes’s edition, on the other hand, there is only one chapter devoted to


philosophical texts, yet it also contains a number of non-philosophical texts by Pessoa.\textsuperscript{7}

The novelty of the present edition, then, is not only that it presents hitherto unpublished — and in many cases, previously unknown — philosophical writings by Pessoa, but also that these texts are arranged in light of the philosophical projects conceived by Pessoa himself. As scrupulously as possible, this edition presents Pessoa’s philosophical fragments in the order and structure that Pessoa started to realize, but never finished — and under the several names he signed them with.

In a draft, Pessoa once writes out the title \textit{Philosophical Essays} (see image on xii), without entirely specifying which of his essays should be included under that title.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7} Besides the problematic editions of Pessoa’s philosophical texts, and the two texts mentioned above, there are also sporadic references to the philosophical texts in other books on Pessoa. For one example, see Pablo Javier Pérez López’s \textit{Poesía, Ontología y Tragedia en Fernando Pessoa}. But López’s book presents the same problems as Coelho’s (which is used as one of the bases for the analysis of Pessoa’s philosophy).

\textsuperscript{8} This draft (written circa 1906–1907) is in the Pessoa Archive. In it, Pessoa outlines a list of essays, all of which he scratched out; in place of those titles he wrote “Philosophical Essays,” thereby indicating a sketch of a new list, but without accurately denoting which essays were to be included in the proposed book, revealing a lack of clarity (or decision) about the contents. In fact, throughout the Pessoa Archive, one finds hundreds of projects and lists of works, most of which Pessoa abandoned. This list, although representative of his interest in gathering many of his essays under the title “Philosophical Essays,” is very confusing and unclear.
But the Pessoa Archive preserves many fragments for philosophical essays, and I believe that there is no more accurate title under which to gather these fragments. The present edition collects what was produced (and has

It contains, for instance, in the scratched out list, references to “studies in phrenology, physiognomy, etc.,” as well as “The study of the character,” which Pessoa very specifically classifies, in another document, as “Microsophy” [BNP/E3, 24–120v], not as philosophy. In that definition of Microsophy, Pessoa lists five categories distinctly not related to philosophy:

Microsophy = the science of the minute.

Includes:

1. Phrenology.
2. Physiognomy.
3. Graphology.
4. Childology.
5. All other small sciences.

[BNP/E3, 24–120v]

The scratched out list also contains “spiritualism” as an entry, but that should be considered in the context of Pessoa’s esoteric thought, which constitutes an entirely different area of the archive. In fact, most of the titles concerning esotericism will appear in other lists not marked “Philosophical Essays.” Therefore, in general, the list is not representative of the philosophical activity developed by Pessoa concerning the writing of the “Philosophical Essays.” That is a possible reason for Pessoa’s scratching out the first list and not completing the second, hoping perhaps to develop a superior (or simply definitive and final) list in the future, but he never writes such a list. The title serves then only as an indication of the plan for gathering many of his philosophical texts under the designation “Philosophical Essays.”
Many have noticed that Pessoa refers to philosophers and philosophical concepts throughout his literary oeuvre. What is still scarcely known is the extent to which his interest in philosophy outstrips these references. In an autobiographical English text concerning his poetical production, Pessoa writes:

I was a poet animated by philosophy, not a philosopher with poetic faculties. I loved to admire the beauty of things, to trace in the imperceptible and through the minute the poetic soul of the universe.
This text, which is often used by Pessoa scholars to provide proof of his interest in philosophy, can be only considered as partially true — like most of his ‘autobiographical’ statements. If we observe the number of philosophical concepts that recur throughout his poetic, literary, and fictional creations, there is sufficient support for the truth of this statement. And yet: it was not only through poetic, literary, and fictional creations — that is to say, as “a poet” — that Pessoa expressed his interest in philosophy. Besides his being “a poet animated by philosophy,” one finds proof in the Pessoa Archive that he was also the author of a series of straightforwardly philosophical prose pieces that remained unpublished during his lifetime.
The Pessoa Archive, which is catalogued at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP) under the designation E3 (Espólio 3: 3rd Archive), is divided into envelopes and comprises more than 27,000 sheets in toto. Each envelope is classified by a number & a designation, and holds a varying number of sheets. Among these many envelopes, 14 are devoted to philosophy, and they contain a total of 1,428 separate sheets — a testament to Pessoa’s philosophical output. To give a single example, on a fragment whose verso is signed by Alexander Search — an English pre-heteronym of Pessoa’s — one reads:

Thousands of theories, grotesque, extraordinary, profound, on the world, on man, on all problems that pertain to metaphysics have passed through my mind. I have had in me thousands of philosophies not any two of which — as if they were real — agreed. All the ideas I had if written down had been a great cheque on posterity; but by the very peculiar character of my mind, no sooner did the theory, the idea strike me that it disappeared, and after I ached to feel that one moment after I remembered nothing — absolutely nothing of what it might have been. Thus memory, as all my other faculties predisposed me to live in a dream.

9. There are five envelopes (15¹, 15², 15³, 15⁴, and 15⁵) with the designation “Filosofia,” one (15A) with “Filosofia-Metafísica,” four (15B¹, 15B², 15B³, and 15B⁴) with “Filosofia-Psicologia” and, finally, four (22, 23, 24, and 25) with “Textos Filosóficos.”
Aside from English texts, the archive also contains texts written in Portuguese and French that touch on figures of the philosophical tradition and that explore philosophical concepts. These texts, which were typically conceived as being part of larger projects, are also unfinished. The fragmentary character of Pessoa’s philosophical writings is consistent with what we find elsewhere in the archive, and he gives an account of this incompleteness in the following English text:

My writings were none of them finished; new thoughts intruded ever, extraordinary, inexcusable associations of ideas bearing infinity for term. I cannot prevent my thoughts hatred of finish[ing]; [...]
My character of mind is such that I hate the beginnings and the ends of things, for they are definite points.¹⁰

Thus, Pessoa’s philosophical fragments express the unfinished character of his writings in general. The Pessoa Archive preserves over 1,000 of the most diverse kind of philosophical texts by Pessoa — on the concepts of sensation, free-will, causality, & so on — while among them one finds the elements of Pessoa’s *Philosophical Essays*.

Pessoa’s *Philosophical Essays* date from, or were at least begun during the 1906–1907 Lisbon period. On the whole, the texts were attributed to two English literary personalities that Pessoa had invented in South Africa: Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search. These pre-heteronyms are independent literary personalities with complex biographies and literary works of their own, and in these pre-heteronymic personalities, we can see the first clear indications of Pessoa’s later, much-discussed “heteronyms.”

In a “Bibliographical Notice” he published in 1928 in a Portuguese literary review, *Presença*, Pessoa introduced Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis, and Álvaro de Campos as his only heteronyms (to date). While Pessoa does not say in that text whether or not he will publish under other heteronyms in the future, he does give us

some clues for understanding his notion of a “heteronym.” In the text, Pessoa makes this differentiation between a heteronym and a pseudonym: “The pseudonym’s work is the work of the author in its own person, save the name he signs; the heteronym’s work is the work of the author outside its own person.”¹¹ In a text titled “Aspects,” which was supposed to serve as an introduction to his heteronymic works, he explains further:

You should approach these books as if you hadn’t read this explanation but had simply read the books, buying them one by one at a bookstore, where you saw them on display. You shouldn’t read them in any other spirit. [...] That doesn’t mean you have the right to believe in my explanation. As soon as you read it, you should suppose that I’ve lied — that you’re going to read books by different poets, or different writers, and that through those books you’ll receive emotions and learn lessons from those writers, with whom I have nothing to do except as their publisher.¹²

Pessoa produces an array of texts written in different styles and attributed to a catalogue of heteronyms. By

doing so, he becomes a plurality of literary personalities, each of whom has authored “works.” Two examples of his heteronymic work are *The Keeper of Sheep*, written under the name of Alberto Caeiro, and *Book of Odes*, written in a Horatian style, under the name of Ricardo Reis. Pessoa’s plurality of heteronyms expresses his conception of the self as a multiplicity. Throughout the works of Pessoa’s heteronyms, one finds traces of this conception of a decentered self that was, most probably, inspired by Nietzsche.\(^\text{13}\) In the poetry of the heteronym Ricardo Reis, one reads: “Countless lives inhabit us.”\(^\text{14}\) In the poem “Passage of Time,” the heteronym Álvaro de Campos says of himself: “I’m more varied than a random crowd, / I’m more diverse than the spontaneous universe.”\(^\text{15}\) In poem XXIX of *The Keeper of Sheep*, Caeiro, the most desubjectivated of all of the heteronyms, affirms: “I’m not always the same in what I say and write.”\(^\text{16}\) The poetry & prose of ‘Pessoa’ is rife with statements of this kind.

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13. In my book *Fernando Pessoa e Nietzsche: O pensamento da pluralidade*, I outline in detail the connection between Nietzsche’s view of the self as a multiplicity and the construction of the heteronomy in Pessoa’s work, developing, just as well, a genealogy of the concept of the heteronym from Nietzsche’s perspectivalism.


But Pessoa’s creation of a pluralist ‘Pessoa’ has a branching, convoluted structure. Besides the heteronyms, one finds other literary personalities in his oeuvre. If we may speak of his heteronym as a literary personality, then we can also say that a heteronym is only one such personality, and that he creates others — the semi-heteronym, sub-heteronym, and pre-heteronym. Or put differently, if ‘literary personality’ can be conceived as a genus, then Pessoa’s heteronyms, semi-heteronyms, sub-heteronyms, and pre-heteronyms can be regarded as its species. And all of these types of literary personalities help to structure his literary space.

Pessoa’s oeuvre includes a number of works by semi-heteronyms — take _The Book of Disquiet_ by Bernardo Soares, or _The Education of the Stoic_ by the Baron of Teive — as well as a set of texts by sub-heteronyms like Thomas Crosse and I.I. Crosse. The difference between a heteronym and a semi-heteronym is this: a heteronym differs from its author, not only in its way of thinking and feeling, but also in its style of writing; a semi-heteronym only differs from its author in its way of thinking and feeling, not in its style. Thus, in his “Preface to Fictions of the Interlude,” Pessoa explains his semi-heteronym Bernardo Soares in this way:

Bernardo Soares, while differing from me in his ideas, his feelings, and his way of seeing and understanding, expresses himself in the same way I do. He is a different personality, but expressed through my natural style.\

xix
Sub-heteronyms, on the other hand, play a fundamentally different role in Pessoa’s oeuvre: they are literary personalities entrusted with translating or writing essays about the works of the heteronyms & semi-heteronyms. The labor of Pessoa’s sub-heteronyms is to divulge the works of his other literary personalities, and their existence is strictly attached to that labor. But underlying Pessoa’s fabrication of all of these other types of heteronyms, are what Pessoa scholars usually call his pre-heteronyms. In a famous letter to João Gaspar Simões concerning the genesis of the heteronyms, Pessoa says this:

Ever since I was a child, it has been my tendency to create around me a fictitious world, to surround myself with friends & acquaintances that never existed.18

The first public appearance of a heteronym occurred in the modernist Portuguese review Orpheu, in 1915, when Pessoa presented for the first time the “Opiary” and “Triumphal Ode” of Álvaro de Campos. But by that time, he had already conceived and written under the name of several other literary personalities. In his early writings, one finds English and French poetry and prose under the names of literary personalities — pre-heteronyms —, which constituted a literary laboratory for the creation of his heteronyms. And among the pre-

17. Ibid., 313.
heteronymic documents, one also finds myriad projects for literary works, to be written in different styles, and attributed to different personalities, many of which already have individual biographies. These early projects, assigned to several literary personalities, constitute a pre-heteronymic background for the creation of Pessoa’s later heteronyms, and it is during this pre-heteronymic stage that the works of Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search emerge.

In the Pessoa Archive one finds poems, fiction, and scientific observations attributed to Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search, and the Philosophical Essays are just one part of their production. In the fabrication of these two pre-heteronyms and the texts written in their names, Pessoa begins to develop subjects that clearly influence his later heteronyms and heteronymic works. At the same time, a poetry “animated by philosophy” will be a poetry alive with the highly varied impulse of Pessoa’s early philosophical texts. And this is, in effect, what he states in a fragment contemporary to the heteronymic productions, where he discusses the difference between his literary creation and that of the Persian poet Omar Khayyám:

Omar had one personality; I, fortunately or unfortunately, have none. What I am one hour, I am not the next hour; what I’ve been one day, the next day I’ve forgotten. Omar, who is who he is, lives only in one world, which is the external world; I, who am not who I am, live not
only in the external world, but in a successive and diverse internal world. His philosophy, even if he wants to be the same as Omar’s, can not at all be the same. Thus, without my consent, I have in me, as if they were souls, the philosophies I criticize; Omar could reject them all, because they were external to him; I can’t reject them, because they are myself.

[BNP/E3, 1–2]19

Though a pre-heteronym, Pessoa already left this short biographical sketch for (& from) Charles Robert Anon:

I, Charles Robert Anon, being, animal, mammal, tetrapod, primate, placental, ape, catarrhyna, □ man;
eighteen years of age, not married (except at odd moments) megalomaniac, with touches of dipsomania, dégénéré superior, poet, with pretensions to written humour, citizen of the world, idealistic philosopher, etc. etc. (to spare the reader further pains).

In the name of TRUTH, SCIENCE and PHILOSOPHIA,

not with bell, book +
candle, but with pen,
ink and paper,
Pass sentence of excom-
munication on all priests and
all sectarians of all
religions in the world.

Excomunicabo vos.
Be damn’d to you all.
Ansí-soit-il.
Reason, Truth, Virtue
per C. R. A.
This auto-psychography of Charles Robert Anon, at the age of eighteen, succinctly expresses the relation between Pessoa’s construction of a pre-heteronym and his new interest in philosophy. In this text, Anon is characterized as an “idealistic philosopher” who fights with pen and ink “in the name of truth, science, and philosophia.” And, in an English notebook titled “The Transformation Book or Book of Task” [BNP/E3, 48C–1–5], Pessoa left us the following biographical sketch and characterization of Alexander Search, to whom various titles are attributed:

Alexander Search.

Born June 13th 1888, at Lisbon.
Task: all not the province of the other three.

1. “The Portuguese Regicide and the Political Situation in Portugal.”

2. “The Philosophy of Rationalism.”

3. “The Mental Disorder(s) of Jesus.”

4. “Delirium.”

5. “Agony.”
“The Philosophy of Rationalism,” here attributed to Search, is probably a variant title for the “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism” presented in this edition — though one cannot be entirely sure. The former title indicates the philosophical concerns of a specific pre-heteronym, side by side with his interest in politics, the problem of madness (or, rather precisely, the madness of Jesus), and poetics.
Pessoa gives Anon’s and Search’s signatures to some of the texts collected here, whereas others are not explicitly attributed to any personality, and should therefore read as if they were written “anonymously” (all such texts have been designated herein as “unsigned”). This is the case with the essays “On the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism,” “On the Idea of Responsibility,” “On Error,” “On Sensation,” “Essay on Heraclitus,” “On Thomas Aquinas,” and “Essay on Pascal,” all of whose authorship can only be attributed with skeptical reserve.20 In the Pessoa Archive, there are also two extensive reading notebooks from 1906: one signed by Charles Robert Anon, the other by Alexander Search. In Anon’s notebook \([\text{BNP/E3–13A, 2 et seq.}]\) one finds

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20. For example, according to some notes about sensation contained in a notebook signed by Anon, we could attribute the “Essay on Sensation” to him. Similarly with the essay “On the Idea of Responsibility,” which was originally conceived as a theme to be considered in the project of the “Essay on Free Will,” explicitly attributed to Anon (such as the essay “On the Limits of Science,” also signed by Anon). In a loose sheet, where Pessoa notes and translates a Greek sentence of Heraclitus \([\text{BNP/E3, 133–8}]\), one also finds the signature of Alexander Search. This could demonstrate that the interest in Heraclitus be associated with Search, but it is not sufficient evidence for definitively attributing the material to him. Thus any attribution of the unsigned texts to a specific personality can only be made, according to the clues left by Pessoa, strictly conjecturally. Concerning the “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism,” we’ve already noted that it could be interpreted as a variant title of Search’s “The Philosophy of Rationalism.”
a lengthy list of books, among which are included the names of philosophical figures followed by the titles of their works — Aristotle, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and so on. The same titles are listed in the philosophical reading notebook attributed to Search [BNP/E3, 144H], which orders philosophers’ works from “A” to “Z” (see image below: cover).
But as this overlap indicates: while some of Pessoa’s *Philosophical Essays* are unattributed, there are also cases where a single text is given different attributions in different contexts.\(^{22}\) This is the case, for example, with the “Essay on the Idea of Cause,” whose fragments are signed both by Search [BNP/E3-15\(^4\), 99-100] and Anon [BNP/E3,13A–5a\(^f\)].

Nevertheless, what is reasonably clear is that Pessoa developed his *Philosophical Essays* under the names of several literary personalities, and within the counterpoise or contradictions of several perspectives. As a result, if one expects to find anything like a unitary system in Pessoa’s philosophical texts, the going will be rough. In fact, he addresses the virtual impossibility of such unity in the following fragment:


... about a single thing ten thousand thoughts, and ten thousand inter-associations of those ten thousand

\(^{21}\) In the notebook designated to Charles Robert Anon, there is a sequence of sheets [BNP/E3, 41–58] stamped with the name of this pre-heteronym, with reference to the readings made by Pessoa in the National Library of Portugal during 1906. In these sheets one finds, just as well, references to Pessoa’s philosophical projects. That Search’s signature is on the verso of one of these sheets could possibly prove the connection between the two personalities [BNP/E3,13A–56].

\(^{22}\) This is the case not only with some of the philosophical writings, but also with other texts in the Pessoa Archive, such as poetry and fiction, for there are many cases of multiple attribution of a text to several personalities.
thoughts arise, and I have no will to eliminate or to arrest these, nor to gather them into one central thought, where their unimportant but associated details might be lost. They pass in me; they are not my thoughts, but thoughts that pass in me.  

This passage, probably written in 1907, yields a crucial insight into the writings in question: they represent a stage of experimentation in which Pessoa develops a multiplicity of perspectives to correspond to multiple ways of facing a philosophical problem or “a single thing.” These early writings — some pre-heteronymic, some unattributed — adopt different philosophical principles in order to produce different conclusions. To try to reduce these texts to a central unifying thought devoid of contradictions would be to betray Pessoa’s chosen way of writing philosophy — when he writes philosophy, he writes philosophies.

From the outset, Pessoa gives voice to a plurality of philosophies through a dialogue with Schopenhauer’s Essay on Free-Will, Pascal’s Pensées, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and so on. His reading notebooks and diaries give an account of the various readings that coordinate his philosophical writings. A striking example of this is provided by Schopenhauer’s Essay on Free-Will. Pessoa owned a French translation of the book and his copy

shows signs of reading (underlining, comments, &c.).\textsuperscript{24} This book influenced the construction of the elements for his “Essay on Free-Will,” as well as his “Essay on the Idea of Cause,” both of which draw upon and question the concepts developed in Schopenhauer’s work. And by 1906, Pessoa had also read Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} in a French translation by Jules Barni.\textsuperscript{25} In Anon’s reading notebook, we find the following statement:

\begin{quote}
Friday, 20\textsuperscript{th} April, 1906

Holidays yet. Bibliotheca Nacional; began reading \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, in the French translation by Barni.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}
Pessoa’s reading of the first Critique would influence the discussion and definition of rationalism in his “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism,” a text that has no explicit attribution. There are also examples of minor philosophical works, such as Alfred Fouillée’s La Liberté et le déterminisme, which served Pessoa as a basis for other essays.

Although Pessoa would later write philosophical texts in Portuguese — and to a lesser extent, in French — it is his English Philosophical Essays that are contemporary with his keenesf interest in philosophy, and hence that form a backdrop for all of his other philosophical writings and considerations. This edition has been designed to clarify the reach of Pessoa’s philosophical writings, and at the same time — in offering a reconstruction of his English essays — to contribute to a more complete knowledge of his substantial philosophical production.

26. Pessoa’s copy of this book is not in his Private Library.
The present edition is divided in two parts. The first contains the *Philosophical Essays*, reconstructed according to various indications left by Pessoa, while in the second, I present a number of preliminary sketches and other texts that shed light on the essays in Part I.

The first essay in Part I is the unsigned “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism.” In Pessoa’s reading lists & notebooks, or those of his different heteronyms, one finds several indications of his interest in rationalism. For example, in Anon’s reading notebook [BNP/E3,13A], one finds references to Thomas Paine’s *The Age of Reason* [BNP/E3,13A–8r], Thomas Child’s *Root Principles in Rational and Spiritual Things* [BNP/E3,13A–9r], and John Mackinnon Robertson’s *Letter on Reasoning* [BNP/E3,13A–9r]. These references are also listed in Search’s philosophical reading notebook, while other suggestive titles are cited elsewhere in the Pessoa Archive, such as J.M. Robertson’s *Rationalism* [BNP/E3,144D2–86r], and Alfred William Benn’s *History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century* [BNP/E3,48–50r]. Nevertheless, that Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is central to Pessoa’s own notion of rationalism, is evident for instance in this excerpt from the essay on rationalism:
Kant's great distinction between pure and practical reason ... He was the greatest rationalist the world has ever had thinking upon it. He worked out his own salvation of all reason in that quiet Königsberg, alone with moral law and the stars. He had that little Königsberg where to stand and thence he could move the earth.

This passage reveals the importance of one of Kant's critical distinctions — the difference between pure and practical reason — and how Pessoa uses it to construct his own notion of rationalism. Indeed, Pessoa's rationalistic affirmation that the “only things that can be affirmed as facts are those which reduce experience by reason to the coordination called science” [BNP/E₃₋₁₅²₋₆₂'⁴], is shaped out of Kant's notion of phenomena. All these clues reveal the crucial position of Kant for Pessoa’s definition of rationalism.

My reconstruction of the unsigned “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism” involves several stages:

1) a first stage corresponds to two manuscript documents, the first entitled “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism” [BNP/E₃, 1₅⁵₋₇₉], the second simply “Rationalism” [BNP/E₃, 1₅⁵₋₇₈], which preserve the initial sketches for this essay as a whole. These documents are presented in Part II, section 1.1 as “1st Stage”;

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2) a second stage relies on two series of manuscript documents titled “Rationalism” [BNP/E3, 153–37 a 45, 133F–64 a 64a], which serves as an abbreviation of “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism.” These documents are also transcribed in Part II, section 1.1 as “2nd Stage”; while

3) the third stage moves to a series of nine typewritten documents [BNP/E3, 152–62 a 70] that contain Pessoa’s final version of the “Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism,” and result from the reconstructive work outlined in the first and second stages. I have added to this sequence of nine typewritten documents a loose text (also typewritten) that opens with the words, “There are two rationalisms” [55G–24r], plus three other untitled manuscript texts [BNP/E3–15r–45r, 46r and 47r], and finally a text entitled “Liberal Rationalism” [155–19]. I consider these to belong with the series of nine typewritten documents since they deal with problems that follow in the sequence of these documents. Together, these texts are transcribed as Part I, essay I of this edition. Additionally: in Part II, section 1.2, the unsigned “An Examination of Rationalism” again discusses the role of reason in the constitution of knowledge, but is an autonomous text.

The second essay in Part I is Charles Robert Anon’s “Essay on Free-Will.” As previously noted, it derives
from a reading of Schopenhauer’s *Essay on Free-Will* and Fouilée’s *La Liberté et le déterminisme*. The development of Anon’s “Essay on Free-Will” has a very complex structure that can be also divided into several stages. His interest in free-will is related to his work on the problem of the death penalty. In Anon’s reading diary one finds the following excerpt from April 12, 1906:

Planned and wrote a little of an English work against the death penalty, and, perhaps, against unkind incarceration. Must read books on free-will to be able to attack the death penalty.\(^28\)

Thus, starting with Anon’s interest in the question of the death penalty, the development of his interest in the problem of free-will had three main stages:

1) the elaboration of a text called “Against the Death-Penalty” [BNP/E3, 55E−2 e 3] that deals with the question of free-will in the context of Pessoa’s defense of the abolition of the death penalty. This unsigned text is presented in Part II, section 2.1;

2) the development of Pessoa’s interest in free-will corresponds to the elaboration of an unsigned document titled “Essay on Liberty. Or on [the] Basis of Ethics” [BNP/E3, 48H−61r]. The projects for this essay and the fragments that can be related to it are presented in Part II, section 2.2;

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3) the projects and fragments for Anon’s “Essay on Free-Will” correspond to Part I, essay 2.

This “Essay on Free Will,” which presents the last development of Pessoa’s interest in free-will in the early Lisbon notebooks, corresponds to the attempt to demonstrate through his analysis and, in many cases, appropriation of Schopenhauer’s and Fouillée’s arguments, that our consciousness of free-will is an illusion based on an attribution to the world of our notion of physical liberty. This is precisely what one reads in the following fragment of the “Essay on Free-Will”:

The idea of free-will, in my opinion, has its rise in the application to the moral world of the primitive and natural idea of physical liberty. This application, this analogy is unconscious; and it is also false. It is, I repeat, one of those unconscious errors which we make, one of those false reasoning which we so often and so naturally indulge.

[BNP/E3–23–49]

The third essay (unsigned) in Part I is “On the Idea of Responsibility.” The concept and problems of responsibility were initially conceived by Pessoa as topics to be included in the “Essay on Free-Will.” Part of that includes “On Responsibility,” a chapter to be developed during the analysis of free-will — as is evident, for example, in the fifth topic of the following project:
Introduction

On Free-Will

Preface

1. Definitions.
2. History of the Problem.
3. Arguments pro and contra.
5. On Responsibility.
6. Consequences of the inexistence of Free-Will.
7. Conclusion. Character.
8. Index of Chapters and of Contents.

[Apud Fernando Pessoa, El Eterno Viajero – 28.8] 29

29. The title Fernando Pessoa, El Eterno Viajero (Lisbon: Secretaria de Estado da Cultura, 1981), corresponds to a catalogue compiled by Teresa Rita Lopes and Maria Fernanda Abreu. It contains a selection of facsimiles of Pessoa’s writings, including the facsimile of the project transcribed above for the essay “On Free-Will” (identified in the catalogue as “28.8,” the number we indicate to identify the document). We weren’t able to identify the document correspondent to that facsimile in the Pessoa Archive, so we’ve transcribed the project directly from that catalogue. In fact, Fernando Pessoa, El Eterno Viajero was published in 1981, therefore, five years before the cataloguing of the Pessoa Archive in 1986. During that process, some of the documents were lost, while others are still in the possession of Pessoa’s family and, therefore, not catalogued in the Pessoa Archive. We believe that this might be the case with this document.
Nevertheless, in view of the number of writings concerned with the question of responsibility and the basic relevance of this notion, Pessoa’s consideration of responsibility would become the subject of an independent essay, “On the Idea of Responsibility.” In it, responsibility is anterior to, and more fundamental than, free-will. Thus, in a fragment of this work one reads: “Responsibility is an illusion anterior to that of free-will” [BNP/E3, 154–69]. Again, the primary character of this illusion is expressed in the following fragment:

Idea of liberty a purely metaphysical idea.

The primary idea is the idea of responsibility, which is only the application of the idea of cause, by the reference of an effect to its Cause. “That man hits me; I hit him in defence.” “That man struck that other man and killed him. I saw him. That man is the cause of the other’s death.” All this is perfectly true.

Thus we see that the idea of free-will is not a primitive idea at all; that responsibility, founded on a legitimate yet ignorant application of the principle of causality, is the really primitive idea.

In the beginning man is not conscious of any but physical liberty. In the beginning there is no such metaphysical state of mind. The idea of liberty is come by reason, is metaphysical & therefore susceptible of error.

[BNP/E3–23–49]
The fourth essay in Part I is Alexander Search’s “Essay on the Idea of Cause,” which takes its departure from Schopenhauer’s distinction between the several notions of cause in the Essay on Free-Will. Let us consider this passage:

Schopenhauer has divided the idea of Cause into 3 other ideas properly speaking: Causation, excitation and motivation.

Here, Search announces the purpose of his essay: to debate and analyze Schopenhauer’s idea of cause. And in fact, in the French translation of Schopenhauer’s text one reads:

The principle of causality which rules all the modifications in beings, presents itself under three aspects, corresponding to the triple division of the bodies in inorganic bodies, in plants, and in animals; that is: 1st The Causation, in the strictest sense of the word; 2nd the Excitation (Reiz); 3rd finally, the Motivation. It is clear that, under these three different forms, the principle of causality maintains its a priori value and that the necessity of the causal nexus subsist in all its strictness.31

31. Le principe de causalité, qui régit toutes les modifications des êtres, se présent sous trois aspects, correspondants à la triple division des corps en corps inorganiques, en plantes, et en animaux; à savoir: 1º La Causation, dans le sens le plus étroit du mot; 2º l’Excitation (Reiz); 3º enfin la Motivation. Il est bien
Both of the documents in Part II, section 3 — both of which are attributed to Charles Robert Anon, rather than Search — testify to an interest in Schopenhauer’s notion of causality.

The fifth essay (unsigned) in Part I, “On Error,” derives from Pessoa’s reading of the Platonic dialogue *Theaetetus*. In a fragment for “On Error,” one reads the following parenthetical indication: “On Error. A commentary on the *Theaetetus* of Plato” [BNP/E3, 25–88v], while in Anon’s reading diary the exact date of his reading is indicated: “November 16th: Plato: *Theaetetus*.” 32

The fragments left by Pessoa for this essay discuss the role of sensation in knowledge and lead to his consideration of the *Theaetetus*’ argument over whether “Error is in sensation and only in sensation” [BNP/E3, 25–88v].

In Part II, section 4, I also present unsigned texts concerning the discussion of error, titled “Fragments with References to the Concept of Sensation.”

The sixth essay (unsigned) in Part I is “On Sensation,” and this again reflects some of Pessoa’s early philosophical readings. Here, one of his most important readings is likely Fouillée’s *La Philosophie de Platon*. In a chapter of Fouillée’s book, one reads this:

> entendu que sous ces trois formes différentes, le principe de causalité conserve sa valeur à priori, et que la nécessité de la liaison causale subsiste dans toute sa rigueur.

I. The Sensation

Before the sensation, the intellect remained as if it were asleep, containing in itself the truth, but without knowing it and without experiencing the desire of bringing it to light. Through the sensation the exterior world acts upon it, provokes it, delights it or torments it, finally finishes with its torpor and with its sleep. It sees, it understands, it feels, it knows. Suppress the sensation, you will suppress the knowledge.  

This passage, which Pessoa underlined, gives some evidence of his interest in sensation, while another book that influenced his considerations concerning sensation is Alfred Binet’s *L’Ame et le Corps*. In Binet’s text, one finds two chapters on sensation: “De l’objet extérieur nous ne connaissons que des sensations” (bk. I, ch. II); and “La définition de la sensation” (bk. II, ch. II). In Part II, section 4, I collect other texts of Pessoa’s that address sensation, among which is a polemical composition: “On Binet’s Proof of the World’s Existence.”

33. I. La sensation.

Avant la sensation, l’intelligence était comme endormie, renfermant en elle-même la vérité, mais sans le savoir et sans éprouver le besoin de la mettre au jour. Par la sensation le monde extérieur agit sur elle, la provoque, la réjouit ou la tourmente, la tire enfin de sa torpeur et de son sommeil. Elle voit, elle entend, elle sent, elle connaît. Supprimez la sensation, vous supprimez la connaissance.
The “Essay on Heraclitus,” the seventh essay (unsigned) in Part I, contains fragments written by Pessoa in response to his reading of manuals on the history of philosophy. In Anon’s reading diary, one also finds many references to the pre-Socratic philosophers as treated in Alfred Weber’s *History of Philosophy*, which was probably the main source for Pessoa’s knowledge of Heraclitus. The problematic concerning movement, present in the “Essay on Heraclitus,” might also be related to Fouillée’s *La Philosophie de Platon*, which contains references to Plato’s analysis of the Heraclitean problem of becoming.

Part I, essay VIII (unsigned) is transcribed as “On Thomas Aquinas.” Pessoa’s interest in medieval philosophy is suggested by the following note from Anon’s reading diary:

May 13th (Sunday)

A dark and rainy day; remained at home. Read about Scholastic Philosophy in Vallet.35


The brief fragments of the unsigned “Essay on Pascal” — Part I, essay IX — express his interest in and reading of Pascal. In Pessoa’s Private Library, one finds Pascal’s *Pensées* [CFP, 1–116] and *Les Provinciales* [CFP, 1–117], both of which contain underlinings by Pessoa. Nevertheless, his reading of Pascal was critical, and this essay constitutes a critique of the influence of the Catholic Church on thought. The arguments used are similar to some of Nietzsche’s, and Pessoa’s interest in Nietzsche is substantiated by his reading lists. For instance, in Search’s 1906 reading notebook, we find entries for Fouillée’s *Nietzsche et l’immoralisme* and Lichtenberger’s *Philosophie de Nietzsche*, while it is well

36. In the book *Fernando Pessoa e Nietzsche: O pensamento da pluralidade*, we present the clues of Pessoa’s reading of Nietzsche, based on philological evidence contained in the Pessoa Archive.
established that Pessoa read Nietzsche directly and in secondary sources from 1906 onwards. It is likely Nietzsche, then, who inspired Pessoa’s critical evaluation of Pascal.

The tenth & last essay in Part I is “On the Limits of Science.” It is signed by Anon and is one of the briefest philosophical texts ‘Pessoa’ wrote; it deals with the problem of empirical illusion and the immortality of the soul. The title indicates Anon’s interest in science, which is amply attested to in his other readings and writings. A single example of this, from his Private Library, is G. H. Lewes’ book *Science and Speculation*, which contains underlinings and marginal notes in Pessoa’s hand.

5

CRITERIA OF PUBLICATION AND PROVENANCE OF THE TEXTS

This edition presents a transcription and organization of Fernando Pessoa’s *Philosophical Essays*, all of which were written in English and are held at the Fernando Pessoa Archive in the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP). There is one exception, a document correspondent to one of the projects for the essay “Free-Will,” a reference I wasn’t able to identify in the Pessoa Archive and which was therefore transcribed from the facsimile
contained in the catalogue *Fernando Pessoa, El Eterno Viajero*. I am entirely responsible for editing and structuring the texts, but have organized them — as far as was possible — according to clues in Pessoa’s relevant outlines. Other indications have been gleaned from original manuscripts and typescripts of Pessoa’s, although philosophical materials are often catalogued inconsistently in the Pessoa Archive.

In transcribing the material, I have always kept the first version of a word or sentence wherever there is more than one variant. I have adopted this criterion since Pessoa left, in many cases, more than one variant for a word or sentence without indicating his preference, for he never made a final and complete version of these texts. Pessoa used to write a first word or sentence and then insert variants that he could include in place of the first; but considering the optional and open character of these variants, I have taken his first version as a criterion. Regarding “free will,” the phrase is sometimes in lower case, capitalized, hyphenated, etc. — all such variations are Pessoa’s and have been strictly followed. Finally, any textual variants, as well as genetic notes, are given in footnotes that also contain any elements that were struck out, and any other changes made in the original text. This will enable general readers to get a sense of the compositional process of these texts, and provide Pessoa scholars with a valuable critical apparatus. For the transcription of these texts, the following symbols have been used: 37

xlv
Some of the symbols used for the transcription of the texts present in this edition can be found in the following bibliographical reference: Nuno Venturinha, *Lógica, Ética e Gramática — Wittgenstein e o Método da Filosofia* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2010). Others were adapted or created for the purpose and specificity of a general edition of Pessoa’s writings — these symbols will be used in future editions of Pessoa’s fragments.
PART I.

Philosophical Essays
I – Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism

Rationalism

Rationalism holds that the only things that can be affirmed as facts are those which reduce experience by reason to the coordination called science. Rationalism holds that all things outside this are simply unknown, or as yet unknown; but it does not affirm either that they are unknowable or still less that they are false. For what cannot be proved cannot also be disproved. The affirmation that Christ is God, for example, cannot be rejected by a Rationalist because it cannot be affirmed by him. It may be an error; it may be the vision of a higher sight — the Rationalist cannot determine which it is, because he does not know a thing to be wrong unless he can subject it to reason, and he cannot affirm a sense to be non-existent simply because he himself has not got it.

For this reason atheism is not rationalism at all, and no atheist can describe himself as a rationalist unless he

1. those
2. to the coordination called science
3. as yet unknown
ignores the meaning of rationalism, of atheism, or of both. The truth is that atheism is not a form of disbelief, but of belief. It is commonly supposed that an atheist is a man who does not believe in the existence of God. This is wrong, for he is not so negative. He is a man who believes in the existence of not-God. Hence his positiveness, his happiness, and that buoyant faith of a militant unchristian.

Rationalism is knowledge bounded by ignorance. It is no more than this. Where atheism is intolerant or contemptuously tolerant, rationalism is fully tolerant. The pity is that it is not an attitude that can be popular, and this is one of the reasons why real rationalists are seldom, if ever democratic. It is also one of the reasons why they are so ready to deal kindly with what the staunch atheist would regard as gross and immoral superstition. Where they do not know, they ignore. The atheist knows that palmistry is wrong. If he has not tested it, or cannot test it, the rationalist says nothing.

Neither can it be said that rationalism and agnosticism are the same thing. Agnosticism directly implies...
the affirmation that the unknown is unknowable. Rationalism cannot say of the unknown that it is so far known as to be known to be unknowable. A wider agnosticism may affirm that even the known is unknowable — a far more tenable and rational proposition. In this case it may be called Absolute Rationalism — the belief that nothing can be believed unless it is brought under reason, with the addition of the belief that nothing can be brought under reason.

Some agnostics distinguish between the unknown of science and the unknown of metaphysics — the lesser and the greater unknowns, Ursa Minor and Ursa Major of an inexistent sky.

Scepticism may also be confounded with rationalism. But the sceptic, if he really be one, has no belief at all; the rationalist does believe in reason. To a certain extent, as far as reason, the rationalist is a believer. As a matter of fact, he is wholly a believer. It is because the sceptic is not a believer that he destroys himself: scepticism, as in Pascal, was ever the fore-prey of mysticism.

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12. th[ə]e
13. wider /ˈwider/ 
14. †[wɪˈdɛr]ere agnosticism In this case it
15. b[r]ought
16. Ma[n]jor
The half-sceptic speaks like Socrates, I know only that I know nothing. The whole sceptic speaks like Francisco Sanches:17 *Haud scio me nihil scire*, I do not even know if I know nothing.

(My countryman is said to have preceded Descartes, probably because he came before him. But that is mere chronology. I do not believe he influenced Descartes (vide/Stark).18 Metaphysical speculation is not one of the violent pastimes of the Portuguese; even Spinoza had to be also a Jew and a Dutchman to find a private universe. The most any Portuguese ancestor of his could have done was to help to find the present earth at the opposite end.)

□ the transcendental atheism of the Buddhists.

Modern scientific speculation has brought the old atheists to their lack of senses and has given them a finite world, robbing them of the now unfashionable infinity, which they had taken from God to give it to the blackness of mute space and the emptiness of dull time.

□ that negative omnipresent God of the Indian mystics who rises down to himself through the black Jacob’s ladder of an increasingly20 depersonalized autolatry.

17. Francisco Sanches (1550–1622) was a Portuguese philosopher. He wrote a book entitled *Quod nihil Scitur* (That nothing is known), which is said to have influenced Descartes’ method of doubt.

18. Descartes (vide/Stark)

19. the ↓ some

20. a ↓ an increasingly
Rationalism

For human experience includes very little that is rational. That is the primary fact the rationalists must undergo.

The terrible intellectual phenomenon of these such a thing is vain, which is a part of the just spiritual phenomenon of these being anything at all.

Those strange aesthetes of the lesser mind, who can understand the paradoxical beauty of a genius clothed among fools with obscurity, but not the paradoxical splendour of the God crucified among thieves.

Rationalism gathers in very little, because reason has exact very little scope in which to operate. When we leave the figures which denote the coefficient of expansion of iron, we have only the mystery of iron left over.

The strength of rationalism is in its narrowness for all strength is a narrowness. It leaves us ever humble before the infinite remainder.

It may be thought that this is why great Christians, like St. Thomas Aquinas, were rationalists. But the point

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21. |For|
22. the terrible intellectual phenomenon of these being such a thing is vain, which is a part of the just spiritual phenomenon of these being anything at all.
23. clothed among fools with obscurity,
25. has very little scope in
26. for all strength is a narrowness.
27. ever humble
is the other way. St. Thomas was neither a Christian nor a rationalist. He was only a Catholic and a reasoner. The rationalist inverts the position which he put. He made, as the old phrase has it, philosophy the handmaid of theology. But the rationalist, who has no use for theology, which is the affectation of mysticism, considers philosophy as no more than the poetry of thinking.

All I want to give is an expression to a new mood in the withdrawal from speculating.

The materialist is sure. The rationalist is aware.

□ and man who would not forget to † a knight with “God”? Is not St. Paul worth the Saint; for this is no etiquette □

[65c]

Rationalism

If this slight book be read by any rationalist who had Paine for governess, he will, when this point is reached, have pleasure in finding me out. But, like Mr. Jingle, I would rather have that than that he found me in.

For this is only a notion of reality. Reality is not only stones and plants, with a moving sprinkling of animals. It is also the dreams, the visions, the mystical experiences, of the substance and passing of mankind. Christ may

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28. makes theology
29. for this is
30. a moving sprinkling
not be real as reality, but has been real as an ideality. For
the realist, who is the rationalist, that is as enough as the
stars. The ideal men have loved is as real as the woman
men have loved, for the love is the one actual thing.

The end of reason is a weariness of thinking. Yet rea-
son is so strong that even its weariness is a part of its
strength and we dream rationally if we have learnt reason.


|The rumour is abroad that the Gods are dead. But the Gods, being immortal, are very lively.|

|We may conceive the total of mankind as the pas-
sengers and crew of a ship of fools, left helmless on an
uncharted ocean. They will make games last while life
endures, and have death for a certainty, with some expec-
tation of being saved, for there may be a better map for
a ship coming on their way.|

[66r]

Rationalism

... dreary as a languid gorgeousness, like that of Faerie
Queene, which not even Edmund Spenser ever dared to
read through in all the entirety there is of it.

☐ the old bourgeoisie of the wrong rationalism, from

31. rumours
32. [w|c]oming
33. of † the wrong rationalism,
poor old Thomas Paine, who to Mr. J. M. Robertson, who dispossessed God of infinity in favour of that universal interval called space.

It is brilliant to the point of nauseousness...

But the rationalist makes no conflict with any man’s opinions. He admits the possibility of the existence of God and the possibility of that God being the wood idol of the African wilds. Like Baudelaire, he would say to the disgusted sailor who wanted to throw that idol into a corner, “Et si c’était le vrai Dieu?”

34. John Mackinnon Robertson (1856–1933) was a member of the English rationalist movement that emerged in the United Kingdom between the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century. In Pessoa’s Private Library, there are twenty-three books by Robertson: Pioneer Humanists [CFP, 1–129]; Pagan Christs [CFP, 2–54]; Browning and Tennyson as Teachers [CFP, 8–475]; A Short History of Freethought [CFP, 1–130]; Christianity and Mythology [CFP, 2–49]; Essays on Sociology [CFP, 3–67]; Criticisms [8–476]; Essays in Ethics [CFP, 1–128]; Modern Humanists [CFP, 3–68]; A Short History of Christianit[y [CFP, 2–55]; Explorations [CFP, 2–51]; The Genuine in Shakespeare [CFP, 8–472]; The Baconian Heresy [CFP, 8–471]; Charles Bradlaugh [CFP, 9–61]; The Dynamics of Religion [CFP, 2–50]; The Saxon and Celt [CFP, 3–69]; The Problem of “Hamlet” [CFP, 8–474]; “Hamlet” Once More [CFP, 8–473]; Jesus & Judas [CFP, 2–53]; The Evolution of States [CFP, 3–66]; The Historical Jesus [CFP, 2–52]; William Archer as Rationalist [CFP, 8–13], a collection of writings edited by Robertson; The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon [CFP, 1–3], edited with an introduction by Robertson.

35. dispossessed

36. Baudelaire, he would say to the disgusted sailor who wanted to throw that idol into a corner, in disgust
Religion is an emotional need of mankind. The rationalist may not want it, but he has to admit that other people may. It is emotional but it is also a need.

There are conflicts between the pure and the practical reason. The rationalist admits Catholicism but he cannot admit the application of that intolerance which is the legitimate right of the Catholic within himself. The tolerant man draws the line at the intolerance of others. He preaches peace and must kill in self-defence.

Kant's great distinction between pure and practical reason...... He was the greatest rationalist the world has ever had thinking upon it. He worked out his own salvation of all reason in that quiet Königsberg, alone with moral law and the stars. He had that little Königsberg where to stand and thence he could move the earth.

I pay the tribute of thankfulness to that full and exact learning which has been deprived of its due recognition. But, if I honour Mr. Robertson for the learning which he has, I cannot respect him for the rationalism which he has forgotten to have. He is the irrationalist pure and simple; there is no third of reason in his believing soul. He even believes in the infinity of space and the eternity of time, and I wonder what science or experience has taught him that those incommensurables exist.
All science is, substantially, an attempt at science.\(^{40}\) Even if reason itself did not warn us against the conferring of too much truth upon our generalizations, which\(^{41}\) are necessarily always hasty, and upon our observations,\(^{42}\) which are necessarily always imperfect, the historical experience of scientific theories would give our conjectures\(^{43}\) that advice. The history of science and of knowledge has seen, so many truths sink into mere speculations or into provisional dreams,\(^{44}\) that the historian of our minor, as that of our major, philosophy may put a constant query to the end of any and every paragraph\(^{45}\) he indict. Even the dearest littlenesses of science may to-morrow be subverted by great cyclones of mind. We may have to abandon the coefficient of expansion of iron. We may have to controvert Boyle’s Law. It is not impossible to formulate, in a sort of tired dream, the negation of the choicest principles of our external sureties.\(^{46}\) Even two and two may

\(^{40}\) an attempt \(\uparrow \) at science / \(\uparrow \) seeing\(\).  
\(^{41}\) which  
\(^{42}\) upon our observations,  
\(^{43}\) speculation \(\uparrow \) conjectures  
\(^{44}\) truth sink like so many truths sink into \(\uparrow \) mere speculations or \(\uparrow \) into provisional dreams,  
\(^{45}\) constant query to the end of \(\uparrow \) any and every paragraph  
\(^{46}\) sureties \(\downarrow \) assurances \(\downarrow \) certainties \(\).
one day cease to be four, to a brighter understanding of the surface and femininity of things.

Yet, since we have no better assurance than reason for the objectivity of certainty, to take a thing as true because it can be proved is yet an excusable shift of our unknowing. In common with all men, each of us has no more than the objective universe, which we may test together, & the principles of reason, by which we can communicate without our souls. Truth is unattainable, but logic is intelligible. Ghosts may be things, but things are things, even if they be ghosts. We must keep to the world that has been given us, and to the manner of test that we have been allowed, or, at the least, have not been deprived of. If a God has made us, it is a sort of blasphemy to doubt the world he made us in and with, and the reason which he gave us as the means for the understanding of that world. If deeper things in our souls reveal objective truths deeper than visible things, and if subtler operations of our minds yield more certain results than reason, we have no power to distinguish, having nothing clearer than our senses, or to criticize, having nothing more

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47. brighter /↑ deeper and stranger↓
48. excus...able
49. we have ↑ each of us has
50. in common ↑ together
51. at any rate ↑ at the least
52. ↑ objective truths deeper than visible things, and [e|i]f subtler
53. to distinguish[h], hav[e|i]ng
coherent than our logic. Perhaps God makes a mockery of the things he has himself given us, and plays hide-and-seek with his own self. For all we know, this may be possible. But, as wise men, we will take the gift we see and use [the] tools we have received; the rest we shall leave to the action of Fate and to the hidden purpose if these be one of the unknown substance of things.

[68°]

Rationalism

The scientific spirit means three things: (1) the holding as actually (or, at least, provisionally) true only those laws or facts which have been subjected to an objective test, which anyone, given the culture, the instruments and the opportunity, may equally well apply; (2) the holding as actually (or, at least, provisionally) false of the doctrines or pseudo-facts which directly contradict such laws or facts and are either insusceptible not by nature, but by statement, of objective proof or, being susceptible to it, are not or have not been brought to it; (3) the holding as unknown as to their truth those theories or ideas which, being of a nature wholly incommensurable with the

54. Perhaps God
55. to the hidden purpose of the unknown
56. of the insusceptible
57. irreducible not by nature, but by statement,
58. doctrines or theories or ideas which, are either
laws and facts which can be verified objectively, are, by that very nature, insusceptible of objective proof.

This means, to exemplify, that we can hold by coefficient of expansion of iron as being a certain proportional figure;\(^5\) we will not hold by a mystic theory which,\(^6\) without a counter-proof equally objective, may affirm that the coefficient in point is another one; we will neither hold nor not hold by such mystic doctrine independent of that application. The proof that the literal interpretation of the statements of Genesis as to the creation of the world is wrong does not affect the metaphysical principles of the religions based on that Genesis. It affects solely the doctrine of physical creation, in so far as it is thus understood.

When a man of “science” says that, as a man of science, he does not accept the doctrine of the Trinity, he is talking like anything except a man of science. All that he can say, as a man of science, is that he not only has not, but cannot have, any opinion on the doctrine of the trinity. He may also say, as a man — not of science but of mankind —, that he does not believe in the doctrine of the Trinity; in the same capacity, he may say that he does believe in it. He is entitled to either affirmation of faith; but, be it negative or positive, it is always an affirmation of faith. The moment he makes it he has ceased

\(^5\) figure proportional to the length of the proportional figure; 
\(^6\) which, 
\(^6\) science, he disbelieve does not
to be a man of science at all. He has become merely a man.62

This seems very simple, but human perverseness seems to make it as difficult as all final simplicities are. If, however, a mystic63 putting forth that physical doctrine, affirm that it is linked with the essence of his spiritual doctrine and that it is a true type and figurement of it, he should not complain65 if, his own statement being taken as he has given it, the general66 theory be held wrong on the score of the particular application67 being proved wrong.

[69*]

**Rationalism**

Rationalism. Theoretic Rationalism. Practical Rationalism.

Sociology is simply a baser metaphysics. It is so far metaphysics that it seems to be a substitute for it, metaphysical and sociological speculation being generally in the inverse quantity at the same time.

It is easy to defend law and order68 as necessary to civilization. But Athens was never orderly & the Italian

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62. merely a man. ← justly also, which may be more or less, sufficient: he has become just a man
63. mystic /† religiousist\
64. affirms that it is linked with the essence of his spiritual
65. complain
66. general
67. particular application
68. order and law and order
Republics of the Middle Age and of the Renascence had very little order & very little law; yet if the creation of art and culture which distinguished them be not civilization or one of its distinctive characteristics, then civilization is its own opposite. It is easy to contend that a unified nation is essential to its own life; yet Greece, which created the mind of the civilized world, was never the whole of itself, and Italy was best scattered than united, in so far as results to mankind in general are a valid test. It is easy to defend any sociological theory. As in everything, except the bare useless facts, the theory is worth what the theorist is worth, and all is made up, in the ultimate, of aspects of truth.

The legal profession is an immoral and absurd one, but we all counsel of our beliefs, and the better sophist wins — fortunately only temporarily — the futile case he has put himself into.

Some, like Kant, make their philosophies out of themselves. Others, like Nietzsche, make their philosophies out of the negation of themselves. The placid man is placid in his philosophy. The sick man is the philosopher of strength.

Slavery is perfectly defensible. We cannot defend it because Christian morality excludes slavery, and Chris-

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69. the theo except the bare useless facts.
70. aspects of untruth.
71. we were all
72. put himself into
Christian morality is one of the bases of our civilization. The death penalty can be defended, but it will not pass the emotional test. The Inquisition can be defended, and it has been defended. But it will not pass the cultural test — it is rebutted, not by any valid argument, which cannot be emptied of force, but by the rationalistic individualism which the Greeks have given us for the soul of our mind.

[Rationalism]

The Christian ethics may be, as Nietzsche puts it, the ethics of slaves. It is, however, our ethics. We have not to say that we do not want that ethics; we can but say that we are slaves. (We may accept Nietzsche’s assertion, but we must accept the ethics. It is possible that that ethics is indeed the ethics of slaves; if it be so, then we are slaves and that is our ethics.)

When any man defends cruelty or lust or treason, he may do so with the full armoury of an intellectual arsenal he was born with for a soul; but he speaks to sticks and stones when he would persuade more of us than the surface of our possible reasons to agree with him. We may be cruel, lustful, or treasonable by our passions;

73. In the original document Pessoa writes “stocks” instead of “sticks,” presumably by mistake. We’ve corrected this word since the original idiom in English is not “stocks and stones” but “sticks and stones.”
we cannot be so by our emotions. The door\textsuperscript{74} of those theories is definitely blocked in our civilization: it is blocked by the Cross.

The rationalist does not assert that Greek Culture is the best culture: he asserts that, good or not, it is the culture we have. The rationalist does not assert the Roman Order is the best type of order: he asserts that, for better or for worse,\textsuperscript{75} it has been wedded to the substance of ourselves. The rationalist does not assert that Christian Ethics is the best possible ethics: he asserts that it is the only one possible to our emotions. The rationalist does not assert that the internationalist civilization created by the Portuguese discoveries and the \*	extsuperscript{greek} democratization\textsuperscript{76} of learning is the best type of civilization: he asserts that it is ours. For whether it should be there or not, (he asserts that) it is here. There is no more ease in shaking\textsuperscript{77} off Greek Culture, Roman Order, or Christian Ethics than there is in, by the use of some transcendental extension of Mr. Wells’ Time-Machine, reversing the film of history and disiscovering\textsuperscript{78} & reunpeopling\textsuperscript{79} the transoceanic world.

\textsuperscript{74} The shadow of the cross
\textsuperscript{75} best or worst, for better or for worse,
\textsuperscript{76} \*greek democratization / \*hellenization
\textsuperscript{77} shaking
\textsuperscript{78} As is in the original: “disiscovering” means here the contrary of “discovering.”
\textsuperscript{79} carrying reversing the film of history and \*disiscovering and \*reunpeopling
As we cannot repudiate our parents or divorce our ancestors, or divorce our mother to be an ex-mother, we cannot make a secure statement that we owe nothing to the fathers or will henceforward have owed them nothing. We may pay or not our debts, we may right or not have debts — we cannot say they were something which is not particularly done.

[55G – 24r]

There are two rationalisms. There is a lower, or fetishistic, rationalism which is that of rationalists commonly so called, and commonly so calling themselves; and there is a higher rationalism. Both believe — at bottom this is, like the bottom of everything else, an unverifiable belief — that reason is all that we have, or the best we have, to investigate truth. The two differ as to what they consider the truth that can be investigated. The lower rationalism is still captive of the old metaphysical myth — that reason can reach metaphysical conclusions. The higher rationalism, basing on the prem-

80. our parents or divorce our ancestors, or divorce our mother to be an ex-father, or mother
81. our
82. or not our
83. of the rationalists
84. In the original, Pessoa has “inverifiable.” Possible authorial lapse.
85. we have, and the most that
ise that all knowledge comes from the senses, and that reason is not a sense, cannot admit the possibility of reason more than sifting the data of the senses; and as there are no known senses (unless the mystics are right, which we cannot verify to universal satisfaction) which supply metaphysical data, reason is powerless to arrive at any conclusion as to the fundamentals of being. All faiths, however absurd they may seem, or contradictory, are therefore possible; they cannot be denounced as false; they must simply be let live as probabilities that never can be verified. This leads to tolerance without an effort.

The attitude of higher rationalism receives its symbol in that celebrated anecdote, which is related of Baudelaire. A naval officer, a friend of his, who had just returned from a long colonial voyage, was showing him a fetish he had brought back; he showed him with disgust that wooden object, the astonishing idol of a human race. And, as he, after having shown it, was going to throw it in disgust into a corner, Baudelaire laid sudden hands upon his arm. "Stop!" he said, "What if it were the true God?" — *Et si c’était le vrai Dieu?* — This is the higher rationalism, both in essence and in tone.

The two rationalisms split, again, over the sociological problem. It is almost invariable that the lower rationalist should be a democrat, a believer in that myth called "the people." As he is generally an atheist — that is to say, a believer with a minus sign — he caries the typical

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86. T[j|h]is
on the nature & meaning of rationalism

attitude of belief into a concrete sphere, as all believers do. Where one believes in the Pentateuch, another believes in Democracy.

[15\textsuperscript{1}–45\textsuperscript{r}]

The monism of Force-matter has become, as you know, old; it has been superseded by the Force-Monism of Gustave Le Bon.\textsuperscript{87} The blind, stupid, unscrupulous philosophy (for so it is called) of Haeckel\textsuperscript{88} has grown old in\textsuperscript{89} its metaphysical aspect.

The lack\textsuperscript{90} of criticism of reason, by which your system is dogmatic, is the cause of this. What affirms the right of reason to pursue the infinite? Scientific prejudice,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) was a psychologist, sociologist, and amateur physicist. His work concerned the psychology of the masses and the evolution of social forces. In the field of physics he developed many theories concerning the evolution of matter. In Pessoa’s Private Library, there are three books by Le Bon: \textit{L’évolution de la matière} [CFP, 1–81]; \textit{L’évolution des forces} [CFP, 1–82]; and \textit{La Psychologie politique et la défense sociale} [CFP, 1–83].
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) was a German naturalist and one of the great figures of positivism. He is known to be one of the most important divulgers of Darwin’s works. In Pessoa’s Private Library, there are four books, in French translation, by Haeckel: \textit{Les merveilles de la vie} [CFP, 1–65]; \textit{Origine de l’homme} [CFP, 5–17]; \textit{Histoire de la création des êtres organisés d’après les lois naturelles} [CFP, 5–16]; \textit{Les énigmes de l’univers} [CFP, 1–64].
\item \textsuperscript{89} grown \textsuperscript{r} in
\item \textsuperscript{90} Thus for instance infinity of matter. The lack
\end{itemize}
convention — ultimately in some cases intellectual dishonesty.91 Common sense is the worst enemy of philosophy.

[151–46†]

The second reason for differing from your system is the92 numerous inconsequences of scientific thought. Any really profound thinker, rationalist or not, will grasp at the joining of the ideas of matter and of eternity, not to speak of those of eternity and infinity and of evolution. Scientific inquiry and observation blunt the reasoning93 powers; there is no sure way of training the mind in dialectics than reasoning independent of observation.94

Rationalism is dogmatic, and it is not a system of philosophy. Telescopes95 search the sky and, as they find no limit, they declare matter infinite. But such is no scientific method. Such is a pure assumption, which is the outcome of your idea of Rationalism. How do you know that reason has the power to affirm infinite multiplication.

[151–47†]

The foundations of morals are triple: instinct, which

91. cases intellect/ual dishonesty
92. is that is the
93. blunts the reasoning
94. other sure way of training the mind in reasoning dialectics than reasoning independent of observation
95. How Telescopes
produces civics; obedience, which produces inhibition; reason, which produces harmony in action.

Reason, by itself, is not moral, because there is no moral to come out from reason. Reason does not create; it merely limits.

A true rationalist is incapable of altruism, because he cannot see, by reason, any reason for altruism. Morality is irrational. But life itself is irrational, and morality is fundamental as being such.

[155–19]
Liberal Rationalism
1. Chapter on: Fallacies

There are two errors that may be committed in this respect. One is to make metaphysics a science, the other to make science a metaphysics. The first any theist commits; the second is committed for instance by Professor Haeckel in his “Riddles of the Universe.”

Let us abandon, indeed, metaphysics for science, but, doing so, let us remember that science does not substitute metaphysics; its province is another. If a man attempt to fly and fail, we may laugh and abandon the idea of flying, by walking; but we must say that we are flying. It is into this error that many scientists fall, materialists or deists, Sir Andrew Lang or Haeckel or Brüchner.

96. committed for instance by
Christianity, anthropomorphism can be attacked — at least attacked by science. Pure deism never — its form is another. Quite outside (if not above) Science.

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97. Andrew Lang (1844–1912) was a Scottish poet, novelist, literary critic, and translator. He became known for his collection of fairy tales and folk stories, as well as for his translation (in collaboration with others) of Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. He also developed work in the field of the psychical sciences, and later became president of the Society for Psychical Research.

98. Ludwig Brückner was a German physicist and philosopher and is known as a partisan of materialism. In Pessoa’s Private Library, there are two works, in French translations, by him: *Force et matière* [CFP, 1–15]; *L’homme selon la science* [CFP, 1–16].
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Fernando Pessoa claimed to be inhabited by “thousands of philosophies,” all of which he intended to develop in his unfinished project of English-language Philosophical Essays. Pessoa himself never published the resulting fragments and nearly the entirety of them are presented in this edition for the very first time in history.

This volume exhibits Pessoa’s musings and wild insights on the history of philosophy, the failures of subjectivity, and the structure of the universe to reveal an unexpectedly scholarly, facetious, and vigorous theoretical mind. Written mainly under the pre-heteronyms of Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search, these texts constitute the foundation for the fabrication of Pessoa’s future heteronyms. They are the testimony of a writer who referred to himself as a “poet animated by philosophy.”

Through editor Nuno Ribeiro’s careful critical efforts, a new and fundamental facet of the work of one of modernity’s most seminal geniuses has now been brought to light in a remarkably reliable and clear fashion.